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COMMENTS 
REGULATION OF BUSINESS - SHERMAN AcT - ADMINISTRATION 
AND ENFORCEMENT-A RE-ANALYSIS OF CONSENT DECREES - No 
problem in the field of antitrust administration and enforcement 
has attracted so much attention or generated so much comment 
recently as has the increased use of consent decrees in civil prose-
cutions1 brought by the Department of J ustice2 under the Sherman 
Act.3 The consent decree may be approached from many different 
angles. No study of this weapon of antitrust administration has 
touched upon all aspects of the problem.4 This comment will deal 
with a review of the history, nature, and use of the consent decree, 
an analysis of some of the more recent and important decrees, and 
a discussion of the crucial problem, raised especially by the Report 
of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Anti-
trust Laws,5 of the constitutional and statutory bases ( or lack 
thereof) for the relief granted by consent decrees. 
I. History, Nature and Use of Consent Decrees 
In 1906 the first consent decree in a civil suit filed under the 
Sherman Act was entered in the case of United States v. Otis Ele-
1 A consent decree is entered only in a civil suit brought in a federal district court 
under §4 of the Sherman Act. 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4. Criminal 
prosecutions. under the Sherman Act are never ended by consent judgment but may be, 
and often are, either nolprossed by the government or ended by a plea of nolo contendere 
on the part of the defendants, either one of which may be considered the practical equiva-
lent to a consent decree. See, generally, Duncan, "The 'Big Case'-When Tried Crim-
inally," 4 WEST. REs. L. REv. 99 at 108 (1953); Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of 
Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34 at 35, n. 3 (1950). 
2 This comment is confined to the use of consent decrees by the Department of Justice. 
On the consent ·settlement procedure utilized by the Federal Trade Commission, see 
Sheehy, "Consent Settlements of Federal Trade Commission Complaints," FEDERAL ANTI· 
TRUST LAws 285 (1953) (University of Michigan Summer Institute). 
8 Commonly, consent settlements are negotiated as to complaints brought under §§1 
and/or 2 of the Sherman Act. But many consent decrees are entered in cases involving 
the Clayton Act. For a recent and important case arising under §7 of that act [38 Stat. 
L. 731 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. L. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §18], see United 
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., . (D.C. Ill. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Gas. ,r68,253. See also 
United States v. General Shoe Corp., (D.C. Tenn. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,271. 
4 The major studies to date in this area are, chronologically, Donovan and McAllister, 
"Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Antitrust Laws," 46 HARV. L. REv. 885 
(1933); Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 88-
97 (1940); Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53 
HAR.v. L. REv. 386 (1940); Katz, "The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 
HARv. L. REv. 415 (1940); Timberg, "Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judg-
-ments," IO FED. B.J. 351 (1949); Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust 
Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34 (1950). 
5 REPORT OF TiiE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY TiiE ANTITRUST 
LAws 361 (1955), hereinafter cited as R.EPoRT. 
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vator Co.,6 in which the defendants, while denying any violation 
of the act and stating that they had no desire or intention to violate 
it, nevertheless consented to the entry of a decree against them. 
Since 1906, this procedure has become commonplace. For exam-
ple, 72 percent of all civil actions filed by the Department of J us-
tice in the years 1935 to I 955 were settled by consent decrees,7 and, 
while most of these settlements are in "minor" cases, 8 this suggests 
that administration and enforcement of the antitrust laws is now 
accomplished very largely by negotiation. Because a consent decree 
is commonly worked out by negotiation and is given little or no 
examination or scrutiny before being signed by the judge,9 it is 
regrettable but true that the lack of knowledge of the facts or 
issues involved in consent decree cases has led to the process often 
being viewed as either a potential whitewash for the defendants or 
as a device by which the government squeezes all it can get from 
the defendants irrespective of the constitutional or statutory basis 
for the relief sought. Further, the necessary secrecy of the process 
has subjected it to political attack.10 
Why the increased use of and emphasis on consent decrees? 
This question is, unlike most others on this subject, fairly easy to 
answer. From the point of view of the defendant, the consent de-
cree procedure offers: (1) less expense, (2) less publicity,11 (3) the 
knowledge that the decree cannot be used as a basis for a future 
treble damage suit under section 4 of the Clayton Act,12 and, of 
course, (4) less disruption of normal business affairs than would 
6 (9th Cir. 1906) Decrees and Judgments in Federal Antitrust Cases 107. 
7 REPORT 360. 
For other, and even higher, figures, see 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 (1949); Barnes, "Settle-
ment by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 8 (April 1954). 
SSee Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, p. 89 
(1940). 
9 See the instances cited by Isenberg and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through 
Consent Decrees,'' 53 HARV. L. REv. 386 at 408-409 (1940) and Peterson, "Consent Decrees: 
A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement,'' 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34 at 41 (1950), 
pointing out the repeated and constant lack of supervision and control by district judges 
over the terms of consent decrees. See also 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 at 322, n. 13 (1949). 
10 E.g., it has been suggested that a conservative administration can use consent 
decrees to show "paper accomplishment in the enforcement" of the antitrust laws. See 
Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action,'' T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, p. 90 (1940). 
Professor Louis Schwartz, dissenting from the Report, suggested that the secrecy problem 
might be solved by requiring that the Department of Justice publish a memorandum 
stating the back.ground of and the reasons for entering into a consent decree. Schwartz 
dissent, I ANTITRUsr BuL. 37 at 54 (1955), and see WALL ST. J., March 30, 1956, p. 5:1. 
11 On this point especially, see the example given by Barnes, "Settlement by Consent 
Judgment,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 8 at 11 (April 1954). 
12 This is so by the express terms of §5 (a) of the Clayton Act. See Bamsdale Refining 
Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil Co., (D.C. Wis. 1940) 32 F. Supp. 308 (nolo contendere); Baush 
Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, (2d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 217. The terms 
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take place if there were a long, involved trial. All four of these 
factors are important to a defendant, the third perhaps the most 
so.13 From the point of view of the government, the consent settle-
ment procedure offers a means to accomplish results it deems de-
sirable in a given industry without the time and expense necessary 
to secure a litigated decree. Further, it would seem that the De-
partment of Justice has not overlooked the fact that it can secure 
by consent specific measures of relief that it might be difficult to 
convince a court to grant in a litigated case.14 Lastly, the govern-
ment is freed from the uncertainty of the result that inheres in a 
litigated case and also from the requirement of producing and 
proving the factual bases for its complaint and is, generally, sub-
ject to much less formal control in the prosecution of its suit.11s 
The consent decree is, of course, a compromise between two 
parties to a civil (equitable in nature) suit, the exact terms of 
which are fixed by negotiation between the parties and formalized 
by the signature -of the federal district judge. The whole proce-
dure adds flexibility to antitrust prosecution, but it is not agreed 
who enters the bargaining room in the better position. Several 
of §5 (a) are specifically called into play by the recital in almost every consent decree in 
recent years that it is entered without findings of fact or conclusions of law. But §5 (a) 
may not apply where, in fact, part of the case has been litigated-typically where testi• 
mony has been taken. Homewood Theatre, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., (D.C. Minn. 1952) 1952 
CCH Trade Cas. iJ67,333; Don George, Inc:; v. Paral:Ilount Pictures, Inc., (D.C. La. 1951) 
1952 CCH Trade Cas. iJ67,294. See also Ulrich v. Ethyl Gasoline Corp., (D.C. Ky. 1941) 
CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 9th ed., iJ52,549; DeLuxe Theatre Corp. v. Balaban and Katz 
Corp., (D.C. Ill. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 983. 
13 It is interesting to note that the IBM consent decree (1956 CCH Trade Cas. iJ68,245) 
followed by less than a month the filing of a treble damage suit against IBM by Sperry-
Rand Corporation, in the amount of $90,000,000. See N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1956, p. 1:5. 
This suit was later withdrawn on Aug. 21, 1956, and at the same time IBM dropped a 
counterclaim against Sperry-Rand for patent infringement, See N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1956, 
p. 39:6. 
Professor Schwartz advocates allowing the use of consent decrees as prima facie 
evidence under §4 of the Clayton Act, i.e., doing away with the exception made by §5 (a). 
What such a change would do to the whole consent decree procedure Professor Schwartz 
does not state, nor, apparently care. But obviously a defendant will not be willing to subject 
himself to the awesome treble damage recovery without first putting up a struggle in the 
prior suit by the government. Ignoring the question of whether this would· emasculate 
consent decree procedure entirely, Professor Schwartz contents himself with saying that 
in agreeing to a consent decree, the government is "bargaining away all real possibility 
of recovery by private victims." A colleague, Professor Stedman, merely observes that the 
§5 (a) limitation on the use of consent decrees is a disadvantage, especially unfortunate 
in view of the "fact," for which no authority is cited, that the most flagrant antitrust 
violations are those that are settled by consent judgment. See Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTI-
TRUST BUL. 37 at 54 (1955); Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforce-
ment-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 316 at 323 (1955). 
14 See the discussion of this point in Part III infra. , 
_ 15 This overall flexibility in the consent decree_procedure is basically the reason for its 
rejuvenation by Thurman Arnold in 1938. See REP. AITY. GEN. 65-66 (1938). 
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writers have suggested, with a great deal of justification, that once 
a defendant has indicated a willingness to compromise, the govern-
ment is in the superior position in fixing the precise terms of the 
decree.16 On the other hand, it has been pointed out that the 
government attorneys are in a far from invulnerable position be-
cause of their own comparative ignorance of the intricacies of the 
industry with which they are dealing.17 
The nature of the consent decree has also caused confusion and 
uncertainty as to the basic aims which the government ought to 
pursue in consent cases. Should it be simply a question of securing 
specific relief against one "law violator"18 as a means of insuring 
that no future action of a type previously carried on will occur, or 
should the government have the responsibility (since, apparently, 
it has the opportunity19) to seek relief in the nature of industry-
wide regulation on a broad economic scale?20 And, if the latter is 
desirable in theory, is it legally justified in view of the fact that it 
smacks of both the administrative-regulation type of control used 
in other federally controlled areas but not authorized in the anti-
trust field and also of an NRA type of sweeping economic super-
vision?21 These questions are unanswered to date and perhaps are 
unanswerable. But they do suggest that anomalies of consent set-
tlement procedure spring from the ambiguous nature of the decree 
itself. Is it a horse trade between two litigants formalized by a 
judge's signature,22 or is it a decree of a federal district court en-
joining certain business practices, differing from the normal decree 
only in that it lacks specific findings of fact and declarations of ille-
gality? If it is the former, it is arguable that the government is 
justified in (1) asking for relief that would not otherwise be 
granted in a litigated case and (2) seeking to move on an industry-
16 See Horsky, "Settlement,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 102 (August 1954); 
Segal and Mullinix, "Administration and Enforcement," 104 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 285 at 297 
(1955). 
17 Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action,'' T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 90-91 
(1940). 
18 Professor Schwartz' description of a defendant. See Schwartz Dissent, l ANTITRusr 
BuL. 37 at 53-55 (1955). 
19 But see Carman, "Analysis of Chapter VIII,'' ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 
148 at 156 (August 1955). 
20 Hamilton and Till, "Antitrust in Action," T.N.E.C. Monograph No. 16, pp. 91-92 
(1940). 
21 See Katz, "The Consent Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 HAR.v. L. REv. 415 
(1940). Compare the FTC's Trade Practice Conference Rules. 
22 See the brief discussion of this view by Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of 
Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. R.Ev. 34 at 40 (1950). 
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wide scale without prime attention to the allegedly harmful and 
illegal business practices of the particular defendant. If not, if the 
consent decree is thought of as another means of judicial enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws, the converse may be true.23 
In Swift & Co. v. United States24 the Supreme Court gave its 
blessing to the consent decree as a weapon of antitrust administra-
tion. It held in that case that a decree could be attacked, whether 
by a motion to vacate, appeal, or bill of review, only on such 
grounds as lack of actual consent to the decree, lack of federal juris-
diction, fraud in the procurement, clerical error, etc. As for other 
grounds, such as the existence of a case or controversy, the factual 
basis for the decree or the justification for the actual terms of it, 
these points could not be urged by a consenting party in a later 
attack. Later authority has more fully developed and strengthened 
the consent decree. For instance, United States v. Institute of 
Carpet Manufacturers of America25 reiterated that a consent decree 
estops the consenting party from attacking its validity and, further, 
that a decree is not open to attack for failure to state the facts and 
reasons underlying the decree. In legal effect and force, then, a 
consent decree is practically indistinguishable from a litigated de-
cree.26 And in practical effect, it is not unlikely that it affords legal 
precedent for future decrees, both litigated and consensual, espe-
cially as to the nature of the relief granted.27 
Other problem areas which should be briefly mentioned before 
proceeding to a discussion of some of the more important recent 
consent decrees are (1) modification, (2) concurrent civil and 
criminal suits, (3) the appropriate time (before or after the com-
plaint) for the negotiations, and (4) the issue of who should ini-
tially draft and present the decree. 
23 See, generally, Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised 
National Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1139 at 1228-1236 (1952). 
24 276 U.S. 311, 48 S.Ct. 311 (1928). On the history of the packer's decree generally, 
see Donovan and McAllister, "Consent Decrees in the Enforcement of Federal Antitrust 
Laws," 46 HARV. L. R.Ev. 885 at 886-899 (1933); 42 YALE L.J. 81 (1932). 
25 (D.C. N.Y. 1941) I F.R.D. 636. See also St. Louis Amusement Co. v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., (D.C. Mo. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 854, affd. (8th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 988. 
26 See Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53 
HARV. L. REv. 386 at 388 (1940). On the res judicata effect of consent decrees, see the 
litigation involving the Aluminum Company of America discussed by Katz, "The Consent 
Decree in Antitrust Administration," 53 HARV. L. R.Ev. 415 at 420-423 (1940). 
27 It would seem likely that the royalty free licensing provisions of many consent 
decrees (see note 76 infra) must have had some effect upon Judge Foreman when he 
ordered dedication of the lamp and lamp parts patents in the litigated case of United 
States v. General Electric Co., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 at 843. Cf. Timberg, 
"Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 629. 
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Modification of Consent Decrees.28 The federal district court 
which originally enters an antitrust consent decree retains the 
power to modify that decree both expressly29 and by operation of 
law.30 In United States v. Swift & Co.31 the defendant, taking a 
new tack in its efforts to overthrow the packer's decree,32 had per-
suaded the district court to grant a modification of the decree on 
a "change of circumstances" basis. The Supreme Court reversed, 
however, declaring that much more than this was needed to secure 
modification of a consent decree. Specifically, the Court stated that 
the question was not one of changing circumstances but of irrep-
arable injury: "Nothing less than a clear showing of grievous 
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead us 
to change what was decreed after years of litigation with the con-
sent of all concerned."33 The automobile finance decrees34 pro-
vided the Supreme Court with further grist for this particular mill. 
Despite a suggestion of a liberalization in the requirements for 
modification in Chr,,sler Corp. v. United States,35 in which the 
government was the party seeking modification, the Court appar-
ently returned to the strict "hardship" theory of the second Swift 
case in Ford Motor Co. v. United States,36 also a case in which the 
government was the petitioning party. In the latter case, although 
the majority opinion did not even cite the second Swift case, it 
appears to say that the party seeking modification must sustain a 
heavy burden of proving the necessity of the change.37 
Concurrent Civil and Criminal Suits. The Supreme Court has 
given its approval to simultaneous civil and criminal suits in the 
28 See, generally, 63 HARv. L. R.Ev. 320 (1949). Cf. also Hughes v. United States, 342 
U.S. 353, 72 S.Ct. 306 (1952); Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. United States, 350 U.S. 869, 76 S.Ct. 
114 (1955). 
29 Most, if not all, antitrust consent decrees contain a specific paragraph asserting that 
the court retains jurisdiction for the purpose of making any necessary modification. 
80 United States v. Swift 8: Co., 286 U.S. 106 at 114, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932). 
31 Ibid. For the treatment of the modification of consent decrees prior to the second 
Swift case, see 63 HARv. L. REv. 320 at 321, n. 10 (1949). 
32 See note 24 supra. 
33 286 U.S. 106 at 119, 52 S.Ct. 460 (1932). 
34 United States v. Ford Motor Co., (D.C. Ind. 1938) CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 8th ed., 
,i25,171; United States v. Chrysler Corp., (D.C. Ind. 1938) CCH Trade Reg. Rep., 9th ed., 
1941-1943 Ct. Dec. Vol. ,i52.537. See, generally, Birnbaum, "The Auto Finance Consent 
Decree: A New Technique in Enforcing the Sherman Act," 24 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. 525 
(1939); Haberman and Birnbaum, "The Auto-Finance Consent Decrees-An Epilogue,'' 
1950 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. R.Ev. 46. 
35 316 U.S. 556, 62 S.Ct. 1146 (1942). 
86 335 U.S. 303, 69 S.Ct. 93 (1948). See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America. 
(D.C. Del. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 654. 
37 See 63 HARV. L. REv. 320 at 328 (1949). 
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enforcement of the antitrust laws,38 and this is significant in the 
consent decree context. What happens to the concurrent criminal 
suit on the signing of a consent decree? Can and does the Depart-
ment of Justice use the concurrent criminal suit as an in terror em 
device? In 1939, Wendell Berge, then special assistant to Thurman 
Arnold, formally elucidated on an earlier Department of Justice 
release39 and stated that a good consent decree, i.e., one which con-
fers "substantial public benefits," warranted the dismissal of the 
concurrent criminal suit. On the other hand, Mr. Berge contin-
ued, "criminal proceedings should not and will not be used to 
coerce the submission of consent decrees."40 Noble as this last 
sentiment is, it is belied both by the former one and by basic prac-
ticalities. The indictment hanging over the head of the corpora-
tion officer may not be intentional coercion, but it is surely duress 
of circumstances, since he knows precisely on what conditions the 
Department of Justice will dismiss it.41 However, not only is it 
evident that the department has not been unreasonable in the use 
of its in terrorem powers,42 but it has also been pointed out (by 
Mr. Berge himself) that the department is restricted in the consent 
decree negotiations if there is a simultaneous criminal case.43 
Time for Negotiations. In 1954 the then assistant attorney 
general in charge of the Antitrust "Division announced that the 
division was experimenting with negotiating for consent settle-
ments prior to the filing of a complaint but, presumably, after 
investigation had already commenced.44 The Attorney General's 
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws endorsed this 
0 
38 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20 at 52, 33 S.Ct. 9 (1912). 
39 Release of May 18, 1938, set out in REP. ATIY. GEN. 306 (1938). 
40 Berge, "Some Problems in the Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws," 38 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 462 at 474 (1940). Compare the interesting statement by the same author that 
decrees which contain provisions for "affirmative public benefits" are the "only consent 
decrees which the Department is willing to consider during the pendency of a criminal 
case .... " Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act,'' 7 
LAw AND CONTEM. PROB. 104 at 109 (1940). 
41 See Isenbergh and Rubin, "Antitrust Enforcement Through Consent Decrees," 53 
HARv. L. R.Ev. 386 at 402 (1940). · 
42 Id. at 404. 
43 Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act," 7 LAw 
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 104 at 108-109 (1940). See also the speech of Mr. Berge reported in 
6 U.S. Law Week 282 (1938). 
44 See Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 
8 at 12 (April 1954). The first major case in which this procedure was followed was 
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 1954 CCH Trade Cas. 1[67,920, 
discussed in part II infra. However, it was reported that ten other cases in which this 
procedure had been tried preceded the Eastman Kodak decree. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 
1954, p. 1:2. 
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move and recommended "prefiling negotiations whenever the Di-
vision deems it feasible for efficient enforcement.''45 With this 
recommendation, however, Professor Louis Schwartz took excep-
tion. Such a procedure, he asserted, will "whittle away the last 
remnants of judicial control and public scrutiny in this area, and 
involve the Government in bargaining with a law violator not only 
as to the relief but also as to the nature of the accusation to be 
made against him."46 In addition, it has been suggested that pre-
filing negotiations automatically have the result of delaying the 
actual filing of the complaint unduly.47 But the strength and rele-
vance of this latter argument are open to question, for, although 
probably correct, it overlooks the countervailing points that (I) 
the pre-filing procedure saves even more time and expense than 
the normal post-complaint negotiation method and, (2) the nego-
tiations may proceed on a much more flexible basis because the 
prosecutor has not yet publicly committed himself. As to the point 
that the procedure tends to lessen the degree of judicial control 
and public scrutiny, it has already been pointed out that both of 
these factors are already negligible elements in the consent decree 
process.48 Lastly, even though there may be an element of "shap-
ing the complaint to fit the settlement" here, there is no indication 
that, as a practical matter, this is always bad. If it is all right to 
enter into a consent decree that bears a questionable relationship 
to the already-filed complaint,49 then surely it is permissible to 
decide what relief will be agreed to and then draw a consistent 
complaint. At least the suggestion of such a procedure ought not 
to be subject to immediate and blanket condemnation. 
Responsibility for Initiation of Negotiations. Another recom-
mendation of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study 
the .Antitrust Laws was that the government liberalize its hereto-
fore strict practice of making the defendant submit the initial draft 
of a consent judgment.50 This proposal has received a mixed re-
45 REPORT 360. 
46 Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANTITRUsr BuL. 37 at 53 (1955). 
47 Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 
N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 324 (1955). 
48 See note 9 supra. See also Segal and Mullinix, "Administration and Enforcement," 
104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 285 at 293-294 (1955). 
49 In United States v. Hilton Hotels Co., (D.C. Ill. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1[68,253, 
the complaint had alleged that the defendant corporation had violated §7 of the Clayton 
Act by acquiring the Statler hotel chain. In the consent decree the defendant was ordered 
to sell certain specified hotels, none of which, however, were of the Statler chain. 
50 REPORT 361. 
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action.51 It seems likely that the government's position on this 
matter is intimately connected with its thinking on the question 
of concurrent civil and criminal actions. It has long been the 
policy of the Antitrust Division to let the defendant take the first 
step where criminal proceedings were pending, lest it seem as if it 
were trying to coerce a consent settlement.52 But, as long as there 
are no criminal proceedings involved, there would seem to be noth-
ing questionable in the suggested procedure, other than the ex-
traordinarily flimsy argument that because it may give the govern-
ment less of an advantage in the negotiations, it is, to that extent, 
bad.53 
IL Recent Consent Decrees 
Practical limitations preclude a review of all of the many con-
sent decrees entered into by the government and antitrust de-
fendants in the past several years. But some of the more recent 
decrees have made newspaper headlines and more than one has 
contained provisions of more than routine interest. 
The Eastman Kodak Decree. The consent decree handed 
down in United States v. Eastman Kodak Co.54 was one of the first 
major consent judgments of the Eisenhower administration and 
also one of the most publicized, because of its immediate effect on 
photographers, amateur and professional.55 It is significant also 
in that it represented one of the first settlements arrived at via the 
pre-filing method described above.56 By the decree, Eastman 
Kodak is directed to offer its Kodacolor and Kodachrome film for 
sale without making a retail charge for the processing and develop-
ing of the film and also to cease distributing such film with the 
restriction that it be processed and developed by Eastman. To 
facilitate competition in the color film processing business, the de-
fendant was also required to license its patents for color processing 
and color processing equipment on a reasonable royalty basis, and 
51 Compare Chadwell, "Antitrust Administration and Enforcement," 53 MICH. L. 
REv. II33 at 1143-1144 (1955), with Stedman, :'The Committee's Report: More Antitrust 
Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 325-326 (1955). 
' 52 See note 40 supra. 
53 This argument is made, with a fascinating display of logic, by Stedman, "The 
Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 
at 325-/126 (1955). 
54 (D.C. N.Y. 1954) 1954 CCH Trade Cas. ,167,920. 
55 For a recent report of the effect of the Eastman Kodak decree, see WALL ST. J., 
April 24, 1956, pp. 1:6, 13:1. 
56 See note 44 supra, and Bus. WEEK, Jan. 29, 1955, p. 66. 
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also to make available technical information, manuals, designs, 
specifications, etc., relating to color processing to any applicant. 
As a part of this requirement, the decree provides that Eastman 
must send instructors to help licensees in the use of color process-
ing and receive visits by experts of such licensees.57 Lastly, 
Eastman must offer for sale chemicals and other materials used in 
color processing which are not readily available elsewhere. To 
stimulate the free sale of color film without the processing and 
developing charge, Eastman was also directed to cancel all fair 
trade contracts relating to its color film price, presumably on the 
basis that these fair trade contracts were based upon retail charges 
which included the processing of the film by Eastman.58 
The unique and most important aspect of this consent decree is 
its use of a "conditional divestiture" provision. Under this pro-
vision, Eastman will be required to divest itself of so much of its 
color film processing facilities as exceeds 50 percent of the domestic 
capacity after seven years unless it can then show that there is sub-
stantial competition in the color processing market between it and 
independent processors having a substantial volume of such busi-
ness. This is, obviously, a clever self-policing mechanism by 
which it is almost assured that a competitive situation will be 
generated. 
The International Business Machines Decree. Closely paral-
leling the Eastman Kodak decree is the settlement entered into be-
tween the Department of Justice and the International Business 
Machines Corporation on January 25, 1956.59 The government's 
complaint against IBM was filed on January 21, 1952, and alleged 
that the defendant was monopolizing the domestic and foreign tab-
ulating machine industry, "including new and used tabulating 
machines, machine parts and service, cards, and service bureaus."60 
IBM; it was alleged, controlled 90 percent of the tabulating ma-
chine business in the United States. Material to the development 
of this dominant position, or so the government (and later Sperry-
57 This controversial "know-how" type of relief is commonly found in a decree today. 
See Timberg, "Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," 1950 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 629 
at 641-647. One of the first major decrees into which it was incorporated was United 
States v. American Can Co., (D.C. Cal. 1950) 1950 CCH Trade Cas. 'j[62,679. 
58 See N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1954, p. 1:2. 
59 (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,245. 
60 Complaint in United States v. International Business Machines Corp., Civil No. 
C-72-344, filed Jan. 21, 1952, p. 15. 
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Rand Corporation in a $90,000,000 treble damage suit) charged 
were the following factors: 61 
I. Control by IBM of important patents for both electrical 
and electronic tabulating machines; refusal by IBM to grant li-
censes under these patents except to lessees of IBM machines; in-
terference by IBM to prevent competitors from securing patents. 
2. The practice of IBM of leasing rather than selling its ma-
chines and making tie-in arrangements to cover servicing, parts, 
etc. As a practical matter, IBM also controlled all of the cards 
used on its machine due to its control over the paper stock and 
to various other practices and devices. 
3. A closely-knit worldwide organization of subsidiaries which 
supplied IBM with exclusive licenses on all patent rights acquired. 
4. The prevention by IBM of the use of its machines on an 
experimental basis by any lessee. 
5. The practice of IBM of "buying up" inventors with long-
term exclusive retainer contracts and of making contracts whereby 
it was to be the exclusive recipient of any new discovery or de-
velopment in the tabulating machine field. 
6. The practice of IBM of granting discriminatory conces-
sions to large customers in an effort to restrain any competition and 
of arranging inter-locking directorates and interchanges of per-
sonnel with such lessees. 
7. The operation by IBM of so-called service bureaus which 
were able to draw in and control the demand for tabulating ma-
chine service by those who did not lease IBM machines. 
The government, in its complaint, prayed that IBM be re-
quired to eliminate its patent monopoly by any appropriate means, 
offer its tabulating machines for sale, divest itself of its service 
bureaus and tabulating card business, cease imposing restrictions 
in its leases or sales of tabulating machines, eliminate any and 
61 The following allegations of illegal action by IBM is taken from the complaints of 
the government and the Sperry-Rand Corporation. No representation is intended as to 
the truth or falsity of these allegations, nor are the seven points listed intended, by any 
means, to be exclusive. 
It is central to an understanding of the situation in the tabulating machine industry 
to realize that there are, at present, two separate and distinct systems-electrical and 
mechanical. The electrical tabulating machine business comprises 90% of the overall 
market and is controlled solely by IBM. The mechanical tabulating machine business 
comprises the remaining 10% of the market and the sole manufacturer of these machines 
today is Sperry-Rand Corporation. The mechanical machines, as a matter of technical 
fact, use 90 column round hole cards and the electrical machines use 80 column rectangu-
lar hole cards. Hence, it is impossible to interchange the two systems. The foregoing 
facts were admitted by IBM in its answer to the government's complaint. 
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all territorial restrictions, and, lastly, give appropriate technical 
instruction to any persons in the repair, maintenance, etc., of its 
machines. 
Comparing this prayer for relief with the actual terms of the 
decree is sufficient to convince one that the negotiations were high-
ly successful from the government's point of view. The following 
are the key points of the IBM consent decree: 
I. IBM must offer for sale its electrical tabulating machines 
and electronic data processing machines (EDPM's) and not just 
lease them, and must provide service, repair and parts at non-
discriminatory rates for machines that it sells. In other words, it 
must see that a buyer of a tabulating machine is given treatment 
substantially equal to that offered to lessees. IBM must also open 
up a market in used tabulating machines by offering to sell such 
machines received as trade-ins to dealers and also supply such 
dealers with parts and service, etc. IBM cannot acquire its own 
used machines other than as trade-ins or as credit against accounts 
due IBM. The decree prohibits IBM from making leases of 
longer than one year unless such a lease is terminable by the 
lessee after one year, and also from imposing any restrictions or 
tie-ins on its sale or lease of tabulating machines. 
2. The decree requires IBM to divorce itself from its service 
bureau business and establish that business as a separate corpora-
tion. Although IBM may own all the stock in the new corpora-
tion, there are strict terms controlling dominance by IBM and 
also preventing discrimination against other service bureaus by 
IBM or by the new corporation in favor of IBM. 
3. IBM is required to license on a royalty free basis some forty 
existing patents relating to tabulating cards and card machinery 
and, at a reasonable royalty basis, some I 000 existing patents cover-
ing tabulating machines and systems and EDPM machines and 
systems generally.62 These licenses, as usual, must be non-exclusive 
and unrestricted, and must be accompanied by a non-exclusive 
grant of immunity to suit under any corresponding foreign patent. 
However, IBM need not grant a license to an applicant unless 
(with some modification in the case of future patents and with the 
exception of patents on the tabulating cards and tabulating card 
machinery) the applicant either offers IBM a non-exclusive rea-
sonable royalty license on or immunity to suit for infringement of 
62 The figures are taken from N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 37:8. Altogether, IBM 
owns some 1500 patents. Ibid. 
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patents controlled by the applicant relating to tabulating or EDPM 
systems. It may well be that this reciprocal licensing restriction on 
the patent relief softens the blow of the decree on IBM, for it is 
possible that many potentially competitive companies do not feel 
like paying this high a price to get a license from IBM, royalty 
free or not. 
Future IBM patents are also subject to the compulsory licens-
ing provision. They must also contain a non-exclusive grant of 
immunity to suit under corresponding foreign patents, but can 
all be licensed at reasonable royalty rates. Here, too, as a condi-
tion to the granting of a license, IBM can require the applicant 
to agree to grant back to IBM a non-exclusive reasonable royalty 
license as to patents o~ tabulating cards, machinery, systems, etc., 
and EDPM systems, owned or controlled by the applicant for the 
IBM license. 
4. IBM is required to furnish each patent licensee, for five 
years, appropriate technical information, relating to the electrical 
tabulating machines only, at reasonable and non-discriminatory 
rates, including specifications, manu~ls, etc. In connection with 
the required sale of IBM machines, it is also provided that IBM 
furnish technical information and training to employees of repair 
or maintenance businesses, at reasonable and non-discriminatory 
rates. Written material and technical information must also be 
furnished to purchasers or lessees of IBM machines. · 
5. IBM is specifically restrained, for a period of ten years, 
from entering into any long term consultant contracts with out-
side experts or inventors. It may, however, have such people as 
regular employees with regular hours or as consultants under one-
year contracts. 63 
6. Tabulating cards and tabulating card machinery were 
obviously central in the government's mind, as seen from the 
royalty free provisions of the patent part of the decree. In addi-
tion to this, IBM is also required to eliminate any exclusive deal-
ing arrangements as to the raw materials of the tabulating cards, 
to cease discriminating in price as to such cards or prescribing un-
reasonable specifications for cards to be used in IBM tabulating 
machines, etc. IBM must also offer for sale, for five years, rotary 
presses and paper stock used in manufacturing tabulating cards if 
the purchaser cannot acquire it elsewhere and if the purchaser is a 
63 Query whether or not the means for evading this provision is apparent on the 
surface: perpetually renewable one-year contracts. 
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bona fide potential manufacturer of such cards and if, in the case 
of the paper stock, IBM has more than it reasonably needs. Then 
follows the same conditional divestiture provision found in the 
Eastman Kodak decree. Unless, after seven years, IBM can show 
that "substantial competitive conditions exist in the manufacture, 
sale and distribution of tabulating cards,"64 it will be required to 
divest itself of so much of its tabulating card business as exceeds 
50 percent of the total capacity for the manufacture of such cards 
in the United States. 
The American Telephone and Telegraph Decree. The decree 
entered into between the government and the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company and the Western Electric Com-
pany65 came more than seven years after the initial filing of the 
complaint in the action. The decree encompasses three main 
areas, aside from various minor provisions. 
1. The most important provision of this decree relates to 
patents. Some 8600 patents owned by the defendants must be 
licensed royalty free to any applicant. All other patents owned 
by the Bell system are to be licensed at reasonable royalty rates. 
In both cases, the licenses are to be non-exclusive and must in-
clude a grant of immunity to suit under corresponding foreign 
licenses. The licenses may contain a condition that any grants of 
licens~s by an applicant for an AT&T license to any of the de-
fendants must cover patents of subsidiary or parent or co-sub-
sidiaries of the same parent company of the applicant and patents 
on inventions made by inventors or researchers of the applicant 
or other such companies. The patents which are subject to the 
royalty free provision are those that previously had been held by 
the defendants jointly with General Electric Company, Radio 
Corporation of America, and Westinghouse Electric Company 
under agreements dating back to 1932. Included in the group is 
the patent to the vital electronic transistor. The Department of 
Justice stated that the patent provision was "unprecedented in 
breadth and duration"66 and there is every evidence that this was 
the most important provision to the defendants as well.67 
64 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,245 at p. 71,129. 
65 (D.C. N.J. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,246. 
66 N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1956, p. 1:5 at 16:4, 5. 
67 See Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4, 1956, pp. 26-28; 54 PUB. UTJL. 240 (1956). This is not to 
say, however, that the royalty free provision hurt the defendant from a financial stand-
point, as prior to the decree AT&:T had never imposed high royalties on licenses it granted, 
and 1,000 patents had been made available without restriction previously. See N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 30, 1956, p. 37:8. 
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2. AT&T is required by the decree to supply patent licensees 
with technical information relating to the materials and parts 
comprising the licensed equipment, including drawings, specifica-
tions, etc. This right may not be subject to any restrictions save 
that it may be conditioned upon the payment of reasonable charges 
and on the furnishing of technical information relating to licenses 
granted by the applicant to the defendants. 
3. AT&T is required by the decree to get out_ of the private 
communications field and confine itself, both in terms of present 
activity and future acquisitions, to "common carrier communica-
tions" work, defined to mean communications work subject to 
federal and/ or state control. This means, in effect, that AT&T 
must divest itself of its Westrex and Teletypesetter subsidiaries. 
But the government was unable to get the consent of the defend-
ants to the original demand that AT&T divest itself of its manu-
facturing subsidiary, Western Electric Company. And it may be 
noted that, in any case, less than one percent of the Bell system 
revenues came from the private communications area.68 
The American Association of Advertising Agencies and the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association Decrees. On May 
12, 1955, the government filed its complaint against the American 
Association of Advertising Agencies, Inc., the American News-
paper Publishers Association, Inc., the Publishers Association of 
New York City, the Associated Business Publications, Inc., the 
Periodical Publishers Associations of America and the Agricultural 
Publishers Association under section I of the Sherman Act, charg-
ing the defendants with conspiring and combining to restrain the 
business of developing, placing and servicing national advertising. 
On February I, 1956, the AAAA signed a consent judgment in this 
action69 and on April 26, 1956, the ANPA, after having stated 
when the AAAA decree was signed that it would not sign a con-
sent decree,70 followed suit.71 A comparison of the principal pro-
visions of the two decrees discloses the following: 
I. Both defendants consented to refrain from making con-
tracts establishing or fixing advertising agency commissions. Be-
68 Bus. WEEK, Feb. 4, 1956, pp. 26-28. 
69 (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. 1f68,252. 
70 See N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1956, p. 26:4. 
71 (D.C. N.Y. 1956) 1956 CCH Trade Cas. ,r68,330. The Publishers Associations of New 
York City stipulated that it will accept the terms of the ANPA consent decree. N.Y. 
TIMES, April 27, 1956, p. 17:2. 
1956] COMMENTS 107 
fore the decree, it was generally agreed that the "acceptable" 
agency commission was 15 percent.72 The government had 
charged that those agencies which had not gone along with this 
were subjected to boycott. Further, both decrees contain provi-
sions enjoining the defendants from taking any anti-rebating ac-
tion. (As to this provision, the interesting view has been taken 
that it will encourage "chiseling" in agency contracts.73) 
2. Central to both decrees is an injunction against the efforts 
of the defendants to establish recognition of certain advertising 
agencies and to encourage the media to do business only with the 
agencies so recognized. 
3. Both defendants are enjoined by the decrees from attempt-
ing to secure adherence to published rate cards and from attempt-
ing to fix and stabilize advertising rates to be charged so-called 
house agency advertisers. 
4. The AAAA is specifically restrained from enforcing its 
no-speculative solicitation rule. Previously, the association had 
banned speculative presentations by member agencies in the lat-
ter's efforts to seek new accounts.74 
5. The ANP A is specifically allowed to establish credit ratings 
for advertising agencies, so long as such ratings are uniformly 
given when requested by responsible agencies. 
6. Conspicuous by its absence in the ANP A decree is a pro-
vision (found in the AAAA decree, as in most, if not all, other 
recent consent decrees) for the right of inspection of records, ac-
counts, etc., of the defendant and the right to interview and re-
quest periodic reports from officers of the defendant. Presumably 
this omission is justified by an extreme application of the principle 
of freedom of the press. 
III. Royalty Free Licensing: A Case Study in the Scope of 
Consent Decree Relief 
Some interesting forms of relief appeared in the consent de-
crees considered above-compulsory licensing of patents, some-
times even royalty free, "know-how" relief, conditional divestiture, 
right of visitation and duty to report, etc. What is the relation of ' 
these provisions to the antitrust laws themselves? Are they au-
thorized by the Sherman Act and, if so, are they constitutional? 
72 See 254 PRINTER'S INK, Feb. 10, 1956, pp. 26-27. 
78Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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Even if both of these questions are answered, one yet remains. 
To the extent that particular relief has been denied by the courts 
in litigated cases, should it be included in consent decrees? 
It would be impossible to consider all of the different consent 
decree relief provisions in respect to these questions, and so it is 
proposed to consider only the most controversial one-compulsory 
licensing of patents royalty free.75 In considering it, we shall, 
ultimately, find ourselves back to the basic question of the nature 
of a consent decree. · 
As was seen above, both the IBM and AT&T decrees con-
tained provisions requiring the defendants to license some of their 
patents royalty free. These are but two of scores of consent de-
crees having such a provision.76 But compare with this situation 
that in the area of litigated consent decrees. In Hartford Empire 
Co. v. United States77 the district court had entered a decree which 
required the defendant to grant to any applicant a license under 
defendant's patents, without royalty or charge of any kind. In 
remanding the case to the district court for a new decree, the 
Supreme Court ruled that this provision was confiscatory in na-
ture and not justified by the circumstances of the case. Reaffirm-
·ing the principle that "a patent is property,"78 the Court also ob-
served that Congress had not seen fit to adopt proposals to provide 
that forfeiture of patents would be decreed for violations of the 
antitrust laws. Thus, the use of the "patent is property" concept 
is the only constitutional basis suggested for the denial of this re-
lief. Most of the other objections seem to be based on policy or 
75 For a discussion of other relief provisions which may "go beyond existing law," see 
Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CrrY L. 
REv. 34 (1950). 
76 For citation to other consent decrees containing such a provision, see Seegert, 
"Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse of Patents," 47 MICH. 
L. REv. 613 at 636, n. 159 (1949); Timberg, "Equitable Relief Under the Sherman Act," 
1950 UNIV. !LL. L. FORUM 629 at 640-641, n. 52; 24 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 223 at 228, n. 40, 41 
(1955). The scores of decrees listed by these authorities contain either a royalty free 
licensing provision or a requirement that the patent be dedicated. For some purposes it 
might well be proper to draw a distinction between these two types of relief as there are, 
at least, technical differences. For instance, in the case of a royalty free provision, the 
title to the patent is still retained by the patentee and there must be some formal, written 
application by a prospective licensee. In addition, such a provision might always be 
amenable to modification. In the case of patent dedication, however, there is nothing left 
in the patentee whatsoever. See 22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 257 (1953); 24 GEO. WASH. L. 
REv. 223 (1955). However, for purposes of the present discussion there is probably no 
really relevant distinction, and the two types of provisions are considered together here. 
See note 27 supra. 
77 323 U.S. 386, 65 S.CL 373 (1945). 
78 Id. at 415. 
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expediency. Justices Black and Rutledge, dissenting, both said 
that the royalty free provision was proper and was the only form 
of relief that would be effective under the circumstances. 
In United States v. National Lead Co.79 the district court had 
refused to place a provision in the litigated decree granting royalty 
free licensing. The government argued to the Supreme Court 
that such a provision was proper and should be inserted instead of 
the reasonable royalty provision which was included in the decree. 
The Court, in affirming the district court, succinctly stated its posi-
tion as follows: " ... we feel that, without reaching the question 
whether royalty-free licensing or a perpetual injunction against 
the enforcement of a patent is permissible as a matter of law in 
any case, the present decree represents an exercise of sound judi-
cial discretion."80 The Court also stressed, more than once, that 
the aim of a decree was to remedy and prevent wrongs, not punish 
them, and that the royalty free provision has not "been shown to 
be necessary in order to enforce effectively the Antitrust Act. We 
do not, in this case, face the issue of the constitutionality of such 
an order."81 Three justices dissented on this issue, pointing out 
that Hartford Empire was a four-to-two decision on this point and 
asserting that it was not authority for saying that royalty free 
licensing is an unacceptable provision. Accordingly, these justices 
argued that the facts of National Lead warranted the inclusion of 
such a provision. 
The district courts have, since these cases, split on the issue of 
the validity of provisions for the royalty free licensing of patents 
in litigated antitrust decrees. In United States v. Vehicular 
Parking,82 decided after Hartford Empire but before National 
Lead, the court cited the former case for the conclusion that it did 
not have the power or authority to include such a provision. And 
in United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries83 the court cited 
the "patent is property" language of Hartford Empire as a basis 
for refusing this relief. But in United States v. General Electric 
Co.,84 Judge Foreman said that the Hartford Empire holding was 
79 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). 
80 Id. at 338. 
81 Id. at 349. 
82 (D.C. Del. 1945) 61 F. Supp. 656 (decree). 
·88 (D.C. N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215 at 223-225. 
84 (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 835 at 843-846. See also United States v. General 
Instrument Corp., (D.C. N.J. 1953) 115 F. Supp. 582. For notes on the former case, see 54 
CoL. L. REV. 278 (1954); 63 YALE L.J. 717 (1954); 22 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 257 (1953). 
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seriously diluted by National Lead, and he distinguished the ICI 
case on the rather flimsy ground that only section 1 of the Sherman 
Act had been involved there while in the GE case both sections 1 
and 2 were involved. As a result, he felt free to decree dedication 
of certain patents owned by General Electric.85 
The debate on the wisdom and desirability of royalty free 
licensing has continued.86 One thing is clear-whether or not it 
is an acceptable antitrust remedy, the state of the authority in the 
area of litigated decrees leads to no other conclusion than that it is 
not yet, at least, an accepted one. Is it, therefore, proper to insert 
such a debatable and debated provision into an antitrust consent 
decree? In its section on consent decrees the Report of the At-
torney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 
had this to say: 
"In consent negotiation, the Department should not seek 
relief (1) deemed by the Supreme Court to transgress con-
stitutional boundaries; or (2) which, in the particular case, 
could not reasonably be expected after litigation. It has been 
urged that, since the Division, no mere private litigant, en-
forces a federal statute, it should demand whatever relief, in 
the public interest, its bargaining position may coerce. We 
believe that view ignores the prosecutor's responsibility to 
stay within statutory and constitutional bounds. It threatens 
our goal of equitable law enforcement and, accordingly, 
should be rejected."87 
It seems clear that the reference here was to the royalty free 
licensing problem.88 Professor Louis Schwartz did not concur in 
this position, however. Dissenting, he argued that acceptance of 
such a principle would "cut the heart out of a number of consent 
decrees that powerful and excellently advised defendants have been 
willing to sign in recent years."89 Further, he pointed out that 
85 It has been pointed out that Judge Foreman's pragmatic approach to the problem 
was admirably suited to the facts in the GE case. The court had to pry open a forty-year 
old monopoly in an industry in which the profit margin per unit manufactured (light 
bulbs) was so small that even a nominal royalty would have had the effect of discouraging 
competition. See Diggins, "The Patent-Antitrust Problem," 53 MICH. L. REv. 1093 at 
lll6 (1955); 63 YALE L.J. 717 (1954). 
86 See, e.g:: Seegert, "Compulsory Licensing by Judicial Action: A Remedy for Misuse 
of Patents," 47 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1949); 24 Gro. WASH. L. REv. 223 (1955). The members 
of the attorney general's committee were sharply divided on this question. REPORT 255-259. 
87 REPORT 361. 
ss Schwartz Dissent, I ANrrmusr BUL. 37 at 53 (1955). 
. 89 Id. at 53. See also Stedman, "The Committee's Report: More Antitrust Enforcement 
-Or Less?" 50 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 316 at 324-325 (1955). But see Segal and Mullinix, 
"Administration and Enforcement," 104 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 285 at 296 (1955). 
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the problem centered on borderline cases-where the constitu-
tional and statutory basis for the relief was in doubt. The Anti-
trust Division should be allowed to press for inclusion of such a 
provision, he argued, for otherwise it is confined to relief of un-
questioned validity and this "can probably be gotten in litiga-
tion."90 
In 1954 former Assistant Attorney General Barnes expressed 
himself as basically in accord with the position subsequently taken 
by the Report.91 He said that (I) there was never any question 
about the impropriety of asking for clearly unconstitutional re-
lief, (2) during his term of office no relief not previously granted 
in litigation has been included in any consent decree, and (3) as to 
the question of asking for relief "which no court would grant in a 
particular case, then I suggest it merely pits defendant's judgment 
of what is required to promote competition against the Division's. 
And if the defendant is really that confident, I would suggest the 
only remedy is to proceed to trial."92 Despite the fact that this 
statement still leaves several questions unanswered, it must be ad-
mitted that the basic thinking behind it is a bit more comforting 
than the statement by a 1940 antitrust official that a valuable 
aspect of consent decrees is that they "may contain various socially 
desirable provisions for reforming the conduct of an industry even 
though the Government could not force the defendants to accept 
such provisions. "93 
Bearing in mind that the royalty free licensing provision is 
only one situation in which the government has been subject to 
the charge of "going beyond existing law," it would be well to 
conclude by asking just what ought to be the proper position of 
the government in these areas. Where should the line be drawn 
90 Schwartz Dissent, 1 ANnn!.uST BUL. 37 at 54 (1955). Query whether there is an 
element of question-begging here. One of the prime premises of consent decree procedure 
is that, usually, neither party is sure of the outcome of the case if it were to go to trial. 
There is always the chance that the government would get no relief at all. By entering 
into a consent settlement, the government compromises on this possibility and is given 
some relief. Professor Schwartz' argument seems to assume that the government starts the 
negotiations in the position of always being able to get some relief in litigation so that the 
compromise should be, he would argue, on the nature of the relief, giving the govern-
ment something more than their assured minimum, even including relief of a nature that 
they might not be able to get in a litigated decree. 
91 Barnes, "Settlement by Consent Judgment," ABA Antitrust Section Proceedings 
8 at 12 (April 1954). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Berge, "Remedies Available to the Government Under the Sherman Act," 7 LA.w 
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 104 at 107 (1940). See also the speech of Mr. Berge reported in 6 U.S. 
Law Week 282 (1938). 
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between permissible and non-permissible provisions? Everyone 
seems to agree that "clearly unconstitutional" provisions should 
not be included. Though an argument might once have been 
supportable that royalty free licensing deprived a patentee of his 
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment,94 the decision in the National Lead case would seem 
to indicate that not even the majority of the court, in refusing to 
require such a provision, were willing to rest their position on any-
thing remotely resembling a constitutional basis. And even if 
valid constitutional objections could be urged as to the provision 
in the context of a litigated decree, it may be held that the defend-
ant waives these objections when he consents to such a provision.95 
The second possible ground for objection is that such provi-
sions are not authorized by the statute and the prosecution is go-
ing beyond the statutory bounds in including them in a decree.96 
But who determines the statutory bounds? If this determination 
must rest on Supreme· Court decisions, the situation is obviously 
unsatisfactory, for such decisions are too few and, as in the Hart-
ford Empire and National Lead cases, often leave the matter just 
as clouded as before. Should what equals "the statutory bounds" 
rest upon litigated decisions, i.e., if you can find such-and-such a 
provision in a litigated decree, it is acceptable in a consent decree? 
This appears to be the position subscribed to by Judge Barnes in 
the statement quoted above. For example, he apparently is will-
ing to say that as long as the GE case is on the books, consent de-
crees may, under any circumstances, contain a provision for the 
royalty free licensing of patents. It is submitted that the presence 
of one litigated decree is not an adequate or responsible measure 
of what is permissible in all cases in a consent decree. Particularly 
is this so when, as in the GE case, the particular litigated decree 
contained the relevant provision only because it was considered 
essential to effective antitrust enforcement under the unique facts 
of the case.97 A much more desirable standard is whether the 
94 For such an argument, see 19 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 400 (1951). 
95 Id. at 418. There would seem to be a nice question as to whether the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment can be waived by a party. Cf. Rogers v. United States, 
340 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 438 (1951); 61 YALE L.J. 105 (1952) (privilege against self-incrimi-
nation); Adams v. United States ex_rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236 (1942) (federal 
right to counsel). 
96 See Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National 
Antitrust Policy," 50 MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1228-1236 (1952); Peterson, "Consent Decrees: 
A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 34 (1950). 
97 See note 85 supra. 
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relief included could or "could not reasonably be expected after 
litigation."98 The answer that if the defendant maintains that it 
could not "reasonably be expected" he ought to go ahead to trial 
and find out99 is too weak to deserve extended analysis. The gov-
ernment should not be in the position of pushing questionable 
provisions on a defendant in negotiations designed to avoid the 
time and expense of litigation and then justify these same provi-
sions by saying that if the defendant wanted to challenge their 
legality, he should have gone to trial. What may "reasonably be 
expected in litigation" is_, of course, entirely dependent upon the 
particular circumstances of each case. Such a test would not pre-
clude royalty free licensing in any and all cases-the GE case in-
dicates that, under some circumstances, this provision may be 
necessary to effective enforcement. But neither would this test 
allow such a wholesale inclusion, irrespective of the facts, as the 
government has sought and achieved in recent years. 
The line between proper and improper provisions in consent 
decrees is difficult to draw from a purely procedural point of view. 
It is more important to secure agreement on a basic philosophy in 
this matter than it is to draw firm and fine lines to apply to all 
cases. In this respect it is necessary to revert to the contract-decree 
dichotomy mentioned earlier and quote the observations of.a lead-
ing writer in this area to the effect that it is a 
"fundamental concept that the antitrust consent decree is not 
to be viewed solely as a contract resulting from an unrestricted 
bargaining process between the government and the defend-
ants. Rather, it is an agreement for voluntary settlement of 
antitrust issues in which the scope and content of the provi-
sions therein can rise no higher than their source in the legis-
lative objectives and prohibitions of the standards embodied 
by Congress in its national antitrust policy .... It follows, 
therefore, that neither antitrust officials nor a court of equity 
has authority under law to induce or to accept provisions in 
consent decrees unless they are related to the prevention and 
correction of violations of the antitrust laws .... "100 
Therefore, above and beyond any test of what could "reason-
ably be expected in litigation," the provisions of antitrust consent 
98 REPORT 361. 
90 See note 92 supra and adjacent text. 
100 Oppenheim, "Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National 
Antitrust Policy," 50 M1cH. L. REv. 1139 at 1230, 1234 (1952). See also Peterson, "Consent 
Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. Crrv L. REv. 34 at 50 (1950). 
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decrees should be conformable to and justifiable by the necessity 
of prevention and correction of antitrust violations. They should 
not be rationalized either on a penal basis or on a basis that they 
are valid per se if accepted by the defendant in the negotiations. 
In the last analysis, the responsibility lies with the Department 
of Justice. It must recognize that the consent decree is a "full 
blooded judicial sentence"101 issued by a court for the purpose of 
law enforcement. Recognizing this, it must be the party to see 
that the provisions of these decrees conform to the standard 
enunciated above. It has already been shown that the judiciary 
has abdicated this responsibility,102 and it is to be hoped that the 
Department of Justice will now fill the gap thus created. 
Paul R. Haerle, S.Ed. 
101 Peterson, "Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Antitrust Enforcement," 18 UNIV. KAN. 
CITY L. REv. 34 at 50 (1950). 
102 See note 10 supra. 
